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O
ne of the central issues in the 1992 presiden-
tial campaign was how best to promote
economic growth. Because much of the growth
debate concerned fiscal policy, taxation and
expenditure plans came under intense public
scrutiny. At issue were both the level of taxation
and the proper mix of taxes. Similarly, voters
were concerned with the composition as well as
the level of government expenditures. While voter
interest was high, the various programs put forth
grew so detailed that their long- and short-run
effects became difficult to evaluate and compare.
What distinguished the 1992 campaign was a
fiscally sober post–Cold War reassessment of the
government’s economic priorities. All major candi-
dates argued for cuts in defense spending and
agreed that the resources saved—the peace divi-
dend—should be spent on enhancing the nation’s
productivity. This productivity enhancement was
to come from some combination of public invest-
ment and a more investment-friendly business tax
structure. While the candidates’ broad visions
were similar, they disagreed on how much public
investment to allocate to human capital (such as
education and training) versus physical capital
(such as roads, bridges, mass transit, and so on).
Proposals also differed on how to change busi-
ness taxation to promote investment, although all
called for lower costs of private capital. Most
candidates did not openly acknowledge that pro-
moting growth usually entails a current sacrifice
for future public and private consumption.
This article presents an analytical and graphical
framework for evaluating the long- and short-run
effects of a broad range of fiscal policies. Except
for two simplifying assumptions on the structure
of preferences and the production process, the
model is fairly general. The model is well-suited
for insights into the dynamic effects of some of
the 1992 fiscal policy proposals, and it can easily be
expanded to analyze distributional, educational,
and industrial policy questions.1 To set the stage,
I focus first on the effects of changes in factor
income taxation. Factor income taxes are the main
components of an income tax. Factor income
taxes also have a simple connection to most tax
proposals, and this article shows how they relate to
consumption and corporate taxes. Lastly, to frame
the debate on what to do with the peace divi-
dend, I analyze the effects of changes in govern-
ment defense and investment expenditures.
Description of the model
This section presents a simple growth model
that can be used to analyze the macroeconomic
effects of alternative fiscal policies. The model
consists of three sectors. The household sector
determines current and planned future levels of
I wish to thank my reviewer, Evan Koenig, for helpful
suggestions and my readers, Steve Brown, Ping Wang, and
Mark Wynne, for their comments. Of course, any remaining
errors are my own.
1 The analytical model used is a variant on Aschauer (1988,
1989) and Barro (1989). The graphical exposition is based
on and complements that of Wynne (1991). This framework
is extended by Becsi (1991) to deal with heterogeneity and
distributional concerns. For extensions to an endogenous
growth framework with education and industrial policies,
see, for example, Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992).Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 52
consumption, labor, and savings. These plans are
optimal in the sense that households’ choices
maximize lifetime utility subject to after-tax budget
constraints. In the production sector, firms maxi-
mize after-tax profits. This is accomplished by
choosing optimal paths for output and for capital
and labor inputs. In the government sector, tax
receipts from various sources are used to finance
government consumption and investment. Equilib-
rium occurs when factor and goods markets clear
in every period.2
The household sector is represented by an
average household that values the amount of con-
sumption, c, and leisure it obtains in each period
of its life.3 Individuals have a certain number of
hours, H, per year to allocate to leisure and labor.
Let h, where 0    h  H, be the number of hours
devoted to market labor. Thus, H – h is the amount
of time devoted to leisure. For simplicity, prefer-
ences between any two time periods are described
by U(c, H – h) + (1 + ρ)–1U(c+1, H – h+1).4,5 The
pure rate of time preference that discounts future
utility is given by ρ > 0. An increase in this parame-
ter reflects an increase in the individual’s desire
for early gratification.
The representative individual chooses those
feasible time streams of consumption and labor
that maximize lifetime utility. Feasibility is deter-
mined by the individual’s period-by-period budget
constraint. The budget constraint requires that
purchases of consumption goods and purchases
of assets (which are held until the next period)
not exceed current period after-tax income. After-
tax income is defined as the sum of after-tax labor
income, after-tax income from assets, and lump-
sum transfers. Savings are put into interest-earning
productive capital. The budget constraint for each
period is summarized by
() ( ) ( ) ( ) , 11 1 1 ck k t w h t r k l wr +− = − + − + +
where l is the lump-sum transfer (or tax), k is the
physical capital accumulated up to the current
period, and k+1 – k is the net purchase of capital.
The pretax real wage and real interest rate are given
by w and r, while the ti (i = w, r) are the tax rates
on wage and interest income. For example, the
wage tax encompasses payroll taxes for social
security and the salary component of personal
income taxes. The interest income tax is a tax on
the real returns to capital including dividends,
capital gains, and so on.
Households choose feasible streams of con-
sumption, labor, and savings that maximize utility.
This leads to well-known optimality conditions for
constrained utility maximization: the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS)—which equals the rate at
which the household is just willing to trade one
good for another—is equated to the price ratio of
the two goods. The price ratio is the rate at which
the two goods can be substituted and still satisfy
the budget constraint.
Within a time period, households adjust pri-
vate consumption and labor until the MRS between
consumption and leisure is equal to the ratio of
the after-tax wage to the price of consumption
goods, that is, is equal to the after-tax real wage:
() (, ) ( ) . 21 MRS c H h t w w −=−
The MRS between consumption and leisure tells
2 For simplicity, the model abstracts from money and uncer-
tainty. It also does not consider market imperfections and
intergenerational issues.
3 The representative household is assumed to live infinitely
long. An infinite lifetime can be viewed as dynastic families
that care about the welfare of future generations. Or, it can
be viewed as a useful abstraction of long lives. Time begins
in period one, at which point the individual is endowed with
k1 units of capital.
4 From time to time, it will be convenient to assume, addition-
ally, that utility is separable between consumption and
labor, so that U(c, H – h) = u(c) + v(H – h).
5 Alternatively, one could easily expand utility to include
composite consumption, where composite consumption is
defined as private consumption plus the consumption ser-
vices derived from public spending. The services of such
spending as health care, education, food stamps, and trans-
portation enter individual utility as substitutes for private
consumption. Similarly, services from some government
expenditures may substitute or complement private inputs
into production. Thus, the only difference between public
consumption and public capital is that the latter takes time
to be productive and depreciates over time. I abstract from
these considerations by assuming that the consumption
services from public spending enter utility separably, and
that only public investment has productive services. How-
ever, in several footnotes below, extensions are considered.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1993 53
how much additional consumption is required to
compensate for a reduction in leisure (an increase
in labor). Since a reduction in leisure lowers utility,
consumption must rise to increase utility to its
original level. However, as leisure falls, a unit of
leisure becomes more valuable to individuals, so
that progressively more consumption is required
to compensate for a unit loss of leisure. In other
words, the additional consumption required as
compensation for lost leisure rises as leisure falls.
Thus, the MRS is negatively related to leisure
(positively related to labor) and, by the same logic,
positively related to consumption.
From the budget constraint, increasing labor
by one hour of work increases the household’s
take-home pay by (1 – tw)w units. This allows
consumption purchases to rise by (1 – tw)w, which
is the ratio of the price of leisure to the price of
consumption. If the MRS is smaller than this price
ratio, consumers require less consumption to make
up for the disutility of working than they actually
can get. Thus, households find it desirable to work
more, because utility rises when work effort (and
consumption) are increased. Since the MRS is
positively related to consumption and labor, as
households increase their labor and consumption
the MRS rises until condition 2 is satisfied.
When hours of labor are plotted on the hori-
zontal axis and private consumption on the vertical
axis, one can trace the trade-offs between con-
sumption and labor for a given level of utility
(Figure 1). These indifference curves are convex to
the origin and curve upward because an increase
in labor requires an increase in consumption to
keep utility constant. The slope of the indifference
curve is the MRS and increases with labor and
consumption. Higher indifference curves represent
higher levels of utility. The budget constraint also
slopes upward and has as its slope the after-tax
real wage rate. The vertical intercept of the budget
line is nonlabor household income such as capital
income and transfers.
Household plans for consumption and labor
are determined by the tangency of household
indifference curves and budget constraints at
point I in Figure 1. At point A the MRS is below
the after-tax real wage rate. Since the slope of the
indifference curve is less than the slope of the
budget line, the household can increase its utility
while staying on its budget line. The household
moves to a higher indifference curve by substitut-
ing leisure for consumption or increasing labor
and consumption. Consumption and leisure are
assumed to be normal goods: a good is said to
be “normal” when consumption of the good
increases for a parallel upward shift of the budget
line. Reducing the after-tax wage rate is equiva-
lent to a flattening of the budget line. When con-
sumption and leisure are normal goods, this will
move the individual to point I′ where consump-
tion and labor are lower.
Households adjust consumption and savings
across time until the MRS between consumption
in adjacent periods equals the price of current
consumption in terms of future consumption:
() ( ,) ( ) . 31 1 11 MRS c c r tr ++ =+ −
The MRS tells how much next period’s consump-
tion must rise to compensate for the fall in lifetime
utility that occurs when current consumption is
reduced. When current consumption is low relative
to future consumption, its value is relatively high
for the individual. Thus, the compensation required
for a fall in current consumption rises as current
consumption is reduced. In turn, progressively
more future consumption is required to compen-
sate for a unit loss of current consumption. Thus,
the MRS is negatively related to current consump-
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consumption.6 An impatient household has a high
rate of time preference, ρ. This means that an
impatient household requires a higher return of
future consumption for a sacrifice of current con-
sumption than a patient household. Thus, the MRS
will tend to be higher the more impatient the in-
dividual is.
From the budget constraint, decreasing cur-
rent consumption by one unit allows the house-
hold to increase savings by one unit. In turn, this
increased saving allows future consumption to
rise by [1 + r+1 (1 – tr )]. Thus, the after-tax interest
rate affects how much additional future consump-
tion one can have for a unit reduction of current
consumption. As long as the MRS exceeds this
relative price, the individual requires more future
consumption to keep utility constant for a sacrifice
of current consumption than the budget constraints
allow. Thus, households will have an incentive to
raise current consumption relative to future con-
sumption. As current consumption rises relative to
future consumption, the MRS falls until equality in
equation 3 is reestablished.
Given the stock of public capital, k , the
representative firm chooses two inputs, labor and
private capital, to maximize its after-tax profit
from selling its final output, y. The firm’s profits
are given by
() ( ) ( ) , 4 1 yw h r k k k −− + − − + δ
where δ is the physical rate of depreciation of
capital, and (r + δ ) is the cost of capital. I assume
that the output production function is constant
returns to scale in all inputs and given by y = f(k,h)
+ g(k  ).7 In other words, total final output is the
sum of output produced by private inputs and
output produced by public inputs.8
Profit maximization by the firm implies that
the firm adjusts private inputs until their marginal
products equal their factor costs:9
() (,) , 5 fk h w h =  and
() (,) . 6 fk h r k =+ δ
If the marginal product of labor is greater than the
cost of labor, an additional hour of labor will add
more to revenues than to costs. Thus, firms can
increase profits by hiring more labor. As labor is
increased, each additional unit of labor becomes
less productive. The marginal product of labor
falls until equality in equation 5 is reestablished.
Similarly, if the cost of capital is greater than the
marginal product, firms will cut back on capital to
raise the marginal product of capital.
For a given stock of private capital, the pro-
duction sector’s plans for output and labor are
determined by the point on the firm’s production
function where the slope—the marginal product
of labor—equals the ratio of the after-tax wage
cost to the after-tax output price. Increasing labor
increases output at a decreasing rate so that the
production function is concave to the origin. In
other words, the slope decreases as labor is
increased. Point F in Figure 2 gives the profit
maximizing labor–output combination for a given
stock of capital.
Increasing public capital causes a parallel
upward shift in the production function, and the
firm’s optimal combination of labor and output
moves from F to F′. An increase in private capital
causes the production function to twist upward.
6 When utility is separable in consumption and leisure, the

















In steady state, consumption is constant across time, so
that the MRS equals 1 + ρ.
7 Constant returns to scale means that if all inputs are scaled
up by the same proportion, output will rise by the same
scaling factor.
8 To simplify the analysis, public capital is assumed to enter
production separably. Thus, public capital does not raise
(or lower) the marginal product of a private input. Empirical
evidence suggests that this is an oversimplification. For
instance, Lynde and Richmond (1992) estimate that a
constant-returns-to-scale production function with a posi-
tive marginal product of capital is plausible. However, they
find that public capital raises the marginal product of private
capital and lowers the marginal product of labor. Their
evidence on the complementarity in production of private
and public capital is consistent with previous findings.
9 Equation 6 is inoperative in the short run when the capital
stock is fixed.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1993 55
This causes the firm’s labor and output to move
from F to F″. Also, an increase in wage costs
increases the slope of the tangency line and causes
point F to move down the production function.
The public sector purchases consumption
and investment goods. It finances its expenditures
and lump-sum transfers with tax revenues. For
simplicity, in the model the government’s budget is
balanced in each period. In this case, the revenue
constraint of the government is described by
( ) [( ) ] , 7 1 d k k k l t wh t rk wr +− + + = + + δ
where d  denotes defense expenditures. This is a
comprehensive revenue constraint that aggregates
federal, state, and local levels of the government.10
Finally, the goods, factor, and asset markets
are assumed to clear in all periods. In particular,
equilibrium in the goods markets is
() ( ) ( )
(,) () .
8 11 ck k k dk k
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A dynamic equilibrium occurs when all markets
clear. Also, households and firms must be behav-
ing optimally subject to their feasibility constraints
and the government’s actions.11
Graphing the model
In this model, the short run is defined as the
amount of time it takes to adjust the capital stock.
The short-run equilibrium can be described by
equations 2, 5, and 8 and by the fact that the
capital stock is constant. To study the long-run
effects of fiscal policies, one needs the steady-
state version of equations 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8. In a
steady state, all variables are constant through
time. Thus, time subscripts may be dropped. In
particular, this means that the net increments to
capital are zero. The only investment is replace-
ment investment to offset physical depreciation.
The optimality conditions can be jointly
analyzed by combining Figures 1 and 2. Subtract-
ing private investment and public spending from
output gives the amount of output available for
private consumption. This is equivalent to a
parallel downward shift of the production func-
tion and causes points F and I to coincide. Where
the two points coincide is depicted as point O in
Figure 3. At point O, the (downward-shifted)
production function and the indifference curve
intersect at their points of tangency with their
respective budget lines. Thus, point O determines
the profit and utility maximizing aggregate con-
sumption and labor levels.
Point O is optimal for individual households
and firms. However, it is suboptimal for the
economy as a whole as long as the slope of the
indifference curve does not equal the slope of the
production function. If firms increased labor by
one unit, the additional output produced would
increase utility for the household sector. However,










10 As a point of reference, defense expenditures averaged
18.4 percent of total government expenditures, transfers to
the private sector were 35.8 percent, and gross public
investment averaged around 6.8 percent for the period
1986–90. (See Akhtar and Harris [1992] and Council of
Economic Advisers [1992]. Also, see footnote 15.)
11 A perfect foresight equilibrium is defined as sequences of
optimal household consumption, labor, and savings plans
and sequences of optimal firm plans of output and inputs
that perfectly forecast the time path of all prices and
government variables. These optimal plans also clear prod-
uct and factor markets.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 56
the firms. In fact, the difference between the inter-
cepts of the two tangency lines is a measure of
the aggregate distortion from the tax system. This
distortion is termed the aggregate tax wedge.
Figure 3 can be augmented to show the long
and short-run equilibrium levels of consumption
and labor. First, market equilibrium is given by
equation 8. In steady state, this equation reduces to



















Also, combining household and firm optimality
conditions and imposing steady state yields








Since consumption in steady state is con-
stant across time, the MRS between two adjacent
consumptions only depends on the individual’s
impatience for early consumption:

















Since the rate of time preference is the required
rate of return to compensate for the individual’s
impatience, the MRS in steady state equals the
constant ρ. Equation 11 determines the marginal
product of private capital, and it also pegs the pri-
vate capital–labor ratio to the rate of time prefer-
ence.12 Raising the tax rate on interest income
reduces the after-tax marginal product of private
capital below its long-run equilibrium level. To
restore it to its long-run level, the steady-state
marginal product of capital must rise, and the
capital–labor ratio must, in turn, fall.
The market equilibrium condition, equation
9, determines the long-run market equilibrium
relationship of consumption and labor for a given
capital–labor ratio and for a given level of govern-
ment expenditures. In the long run, equilibrium
consumption is positively related to equilibrium
employment. This is graphed as the line MML in
Figure 4. Consumption and labor are linearly
related because the capital–labor ratio is fixed.
When the capital–labor ratio increases, labor is
more productive at all levels of employment. This
causes line MML to twist upward from its intercept.
As will be discussed below, changing government
expenditures causes a parallel shift of line MML.
12 This is because of the homogeneity properties of the pro-
duction function and because public capital enters separa-
bly. Thus, the capital–labor ratio is not affected by wage
taxation and government consumption and investment.
See footnote 20 on how the analysis changes when public
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In the short run, the capital stock is fixed
and the market equilibrium condition is given by
equation 8. The short-run equilibrium relationship
between consumption and labor is represented by
line MMS. This line is just the parallel-shifted
production function from Figure 3. Note that as
labor increases beyond h*, output will increase
more in the long run than in the short run. This is
because an increase in labor lowers the capital–
labor ratio in the short run, which has a partially
offsetting effect on output. In the long run, this
partial offset does not occur because capital and
labor move together.
Equation 10 determines the aggregate trade-
off between private consumption and labor. One
can use this equation to trace all intersections of the
indifference and production functions in Figure 3
that are compatible with utility and profit maximi-
zation. In other words, one can trace all possible
points O in Figure 3 for parallel shifts in the tan-
gency lines for the production function and the
indifference curves. Given the private capital–
labor ratio, these points constitute the line OOL in
Figure 4. Line OOL gives all the desired steady-
state combinations of consumption and labor for
a given wage rate. In essence, line OOL traces
how consumption and labor respond to changes
in wealth, holding relative after-tax prices con-
stant.13 For a given tax system, there are an infinite
number of similar lines associated with different
capital–labor ratios (or wage rates). The paths
lying above and to the right of OOL are associated
with higher after-tax wages or a higher capital–
labor ratio. For a constant capital–labor ratio, a
lower output tax or a lower consumption tax also
causes OOL to shift up and to the right. Thus,
shifts of line OOL represent substitution effects
on labor and consumption.
When capital rather than the capital–labor
ratio is held fixed, equation 10 gives the desired
short-run combinations of labor and consumption.
This is graphed as OOS in Figure 4. OOS is steeper
than OOL, because as labor is reduced from h*
the capital–labor ratio and, hence, the wage rate,
rises in the short-run. Households, therefore,
require a larger compensation in terms of current
consumption than in the long run when the wage
rate is fixed.
In sum, the OO lines give desired combina-
tions of labor and consumption, while the MM
lines represents technologically feasible combina-
tions. The intersection of the curves yields the
overall equilibrium for the economy (in the short
and long run).
The effects of tax policies14
What happens when the government raises
wage taxes? A permanent increase in wage taxes
is the analytical counterpart to increasing payroll
taxes. Wage taxes do not affect the long-run market
equilibrium relationship. Thus, line MML is un-
changed in Figure 5. Since the after-tax interest
rate is pegged to the constant rate of time prefer-
ence in the long-run, a wage tax does not alter
the steady-state capital–labor ratio.
Figure 5











13 When preferences are homothetic, scaling consumption
and leisure by the same scaling factor will leave the MRS
unchanged. This implies that the MRS is constant along
OOL and that OOL is a straight line.
14 To isolate the effect of each fiscal policy instrument, I
assume that the government uses lump-sum transfers to
balance its budget when tax rates are increased. For the
same reason, lump-sum taxes are used to finance in-
creases in government expenditures.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 58
Since the capital–labor ratio does not change,
the wage rate before taxes is unaffected. But since
the after-tax wage rate received by households
falls, households substitute away from work and
consumption towards leisure. This is equivalent to
a downward shift of OOL in Figure 5. Since OOL
shifts down and the intersection of OOL and MML
determines the long-run effect of the wage tax on
consumption and labor, the long-run equilibrium
moves from E to E″. Thus, consumption and labor
fall in the long run. Because the capital–labor ratio
is unchanged in the long run, raising the wage tax
causes the capital stock to decline proportionately
to the fall in labor. In turn, output will fall in the
long run.
In the short run, capital is fixed, and line
OOS shifts to the left. As households substitute
away from labor, the short-run capital–labor ratio
rises. This causes the wage rate before taxes to rise.
Thus, the short-run fall in the after-tax wage rate
is less than the long-run fall. The increase in the
short-run capital–labor ratio also affects the market
equilibrium line MMS given by equation 8. Since
the capital–labor ratio is unchanged in the long
run, investment must fall over time to return the
capital–labor ratio to its original level. A reduction
in investment tends to offset the necessary reduc-
tion in consumption, given that labor and output
fall. For any level of labor (and output), a reduc-
tion of investment means that there is more output
available for consumption. Thus, consumption
increases according to equation 8, and MMS shifts
upward in the short run. Assuming the effect on
OOS dominates, the economy jumps from E to E′,
and labor and consumption fall in the short run.
What happens when the government raises
taxes on interest income? This tends to reduce the
after-tax interest rate received by households for
any given pretax interest rate. But since the after-
tax interest rate is pegged in the long run, the
pretax interest rate must rise. To accomplish, this
the long-run capital–labor ratio falls in order to
increase the marginal product of capital. In turn, a
fall in the steady-state capital–labor ratio will affect
lines MML and OOL. For any given level of labor,
reducing the capital–labor ratio means that labor
is less productive. This reduces long-run output
and consumption. Thus, MML rotates down and to
the right. At the same time, the after-tax wage rate
falls with a reduction in the capital–labor ratio.
Thus, households substitute away from work and
consumption. This is equivalent to a leftward shift
of OOL. Figure 6 shows how increasing the interest
rate tax twists MML and OOL downward. This
causes the equilibrium to move from E to E″. Con-
sumption falls in the long run. Whether labor falls
or rises is unclear and depends on how much
OOL falls relative to MML. Nonetheless, for all
reasonable parametrizations, capital and output
will fall in the long run. Since the capital–labor
ratio falls in the long run, investment will fall in the
short run. Thus, MMS shifts up and the economy
moves from E to E′ in the short run.
To summarize, increasing either factor tax
will lower labor and output in the short run and
increase the capital–labor ratio. But a wage tax
will lower consumption in the short run, while an
interest rate tax will raise consumption. In the long
run, both taxes depress consumption and output.
However, they affect labor and the capital–labor
ratio differently. A wage tax leaves the capital–labor
ratio unchanged and depresses labor. On the
other hand, an interest rate tax lowers the capital–
labor ratio and has an uncertain effect on labor.
A brief glance at the box titled “Equivalence
of Permanent Tax Policies,” shows how taxes on
consumption and corporations are equivalent to
the factor income taxes introduced in this article.
In short, most taxes correspond to taxes on capital
or labor. Ostensibly, having a personal and cor-
Figure 6









MMSEconomic Review — Third Quarter 1993 59
porate income tax implies that tax rates on labor
and capital are equal or that a “simple income
tax” exists. This is misleading because of special
tax considerations for capital, such as depreciation
schedules, capital gains taxes and so on. In fact,
there is evidence that tax rates on capital far exceed
tax rates on labor.15 Thus, it is natural to ask what
are the effects of a reduction in interest rate taxes
One can easily expand the model by
including household consumption taxes, tc,
that comprise excise and sales taxes. In this
case, equation 1 expands to
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Additionally, various taxes can be levied on
the firm so that after-tax profits are given by
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where to is a tax rate on the output of the firm.
Also, th is a tax surcharge on firms’ labor costs,
such as contributions for social insurance.
The term tk is the tax surcharge on the rental
payments of capital and adds to (or subtracts
from) the cost of capital through alternative
tax depreciation schedules, capital consump-
tion allowances, and taxation and deductibil-
ity of dividends, debt, and capital gains.
In this case, the combined household
and firm steady-state optimality conditions
generalize to





















































Equivalence of Permanent Tax Policies
From the optimality conditions, one can
show that the following taxes are equivalent,
in the sense that their qualitative effects on
aggregate consumption, investment, labor,
and output (in the short run and long run) are
the same. The equivalence relationships show
that taxes on corporations imitate taxes on
households by ultimately taxing labor and
capital. It also can be shown that a consump-
tion tax is equivalent to a tax on labor:
1. A tax on the wage income of house-
holds, tw, is equivalent to a surcharge
on the labor costs of firms, th.
2. A tax on the interest income of house-
holds, tr, is equivalent to a surcharge
on the capital costs of firms, tk.
3. A (simple) income tax, ty, is equiva-
lent to taxing households’ wage and
interest incomes at the same rate—
that is, tw = tr.
4. An output tax, to, is equivalent to
taxing firms’ wage and interest costs
at the same rate—that is, th = tk.
5. An output tax, to, is equivalent to a
(simple) income tax, ty.
6. An output tax, to, is equivalent to a
consumption tax plus a tax on inter-
est income—that is, tc =  tr. Or, a
consumption tax is equivalent to a
sales tax with capital costs exempt.
7. A consumption tax, tc, is equivalent to
a tax on wage income, tw.
15 Marginal tax rates have been estimated by a number of
authors. For instance, Hansson’s (1985) survey concludes
that the labor tax rate lies between 0.2 and 0.3, while the
capital tax rate is bounded above by 0.5. McGrattan (1991)
estimates that the labor tax rate fell in the interval between
0.1 and 0.35, and the capital tax rate ranged between 0.3
and 0.6.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 60
and an increase in wage taxes. Such a scheme
may be considered a variant of the investment-
friendly restructuring of business taxes proposed
by the presidential candidates.16 From the analysis
above, one sees that the short-run effect is to shift
OOS leftward. However, the individual taxes
affect short-run investment in opposite directions.
Since the capital–labor ratio rises in the long run,
it is likely that investment will increase in the
short run and that the MMS will shift down. How-
ever, even if the effects on investment approxi-
mately cancel, consumption and labor will fall in
the short run.
Line MML will shift up in the long run,
because the long-run capital–labor ratio rises.
Assuming that the different effects on line OOL
approximately cancel, consumption will increase
and labor will fall. Also, output will rise in the
long run along with the capital–labor ratio. This
exercise is intriguing, because it is possible to get
a long-run expansionary effect simply by chang-
ing the tax mix from capital to labor taxation.
However, the short-run economic costs of such
policies may outweigh the long-run benefits.
The effects of spending policies
Suppose that defense spending falls perma-
nently.17 Since capital tax rates do not change, the
capital-labor ratio is unaffected in the long run.
Thus, the long-run market equilibrium relationship
MML depends solely on the demand and supply
effects of the change. Since defense spending
does not enter the production function, there is
only a demand effect. This means that more output
is left for consumption than before the shock. For
all levels of equilibrium labor, consumption rises.
Thus, line MML shifts up in Figure 7, while line
OOL is unaffected. Consequently, the long-run
equilibrium moves from E to E″, with private con-
sumption rising and labor falling. Also, since the
long-run capital–labor ratio does not change,
capital must fall proportionately to labor.
The short-run effects are qualitatively similar;
only MMS shifts up. Private consumption will be
crowded in and labor will fall because households
feel wealthier. Since the capital–labor ratio remains
unchanged in the long run, investment will fall.
This reinforces the positive effect on private con-
sumption. Since labor falls, output will fall, too.18
The effects of increased public investment
differ from those of increased defense spending.
Because of the separability of the production
function, public investment does not affect the
private capital–labor ratio. While higher public
investment does not affect OOL, it has two effects
on MML. Not only does public investment have a
demand effect, it also has a supply effect on the
market equilibrium condition. If the marginal pro-
duct of public capital is greater than the deprecia-
tion rate, then the supply effect will dominate.
Since this is likely, output increases relatively more
than demand does, and consumption rises for all
levels of labor. Thus, line MML shifts up in Figure
8. Therefore, labor, capital, and private output fall
in the long run, while consumption and total
output increase.
The short-run effect of public investment
does not include a supply effect. This is because
investment takes time to be productive. Thus, the
demand effect governs the short-run market equi-
librium relationship. For all levels of labor, higher
investment means lower consumption. Thus, line
MMS shifts down in the short run in Figure 8. This
means that at the short-run equilibrium point E′,
16 Reducing the cost of capital can be accomplished by an
investment tax credit or by reducing the capital gains tax.
The cost of labor would rise if a tax for worker training were
instituted, or employer health care costs were raised. Since
consumption taxes and labor taxes are equivalent, one
would get the same result by increasing sales taxes.
17 This policy exercise was analyzed by Wynne (1991). He
also considers the aggregate effects of military employ-
ment policies.
18 What if government consumption enters private utility, as in
footnote 5? In this case, the MRS is a function of composite,
not private, consumption. Also, public consumption enters
the market equilibrium condition just like defense expendi-
tures. These two facts can be attached to the graphical
analysis for defense spending.
If government consumption falls, lines MMS and MML
shift up just as they do with a reduction in defense spending.
However, lines OOS and OOL will also shift down, because
private consumption must rise to offset the fall of the MRS
induced by public consumption. If public and private con-
sumption are less than perfect substitutes, households will
work more to raise output and to mitigate the negative effect
on private consumption. In the short and long run, private
consumption will rise, while the effect on labor is uncertain.Economic Review — Third Quarter 1993 61
labor is higher and consumption lower than at the
point of departure, E. Over time, as the economy
moves from E′ to E″, consumption will rise and
labor fall.19
In sum, in the short run, more public invest-
ment tends to lower consumption and increase
labor and output. In the long run, public invest-
ment raises consumption and output and lowers
labor. A reduction of defense expenditures will,
on the other hand, raise consumption and reduce
labor and output in the long run and in the short
run. Spending the peace dividend from reduced
defense outlays on public investment is equivalent
to increasing public investment and reducing
defense spending by an equal amount. In this
case, demand effects will cancel in the market
equilibrium condition MMS. While there are no
supply effects in the short run, in the long run
there will be positive demand and supply effects
on MML. Since the supply effect dominates, MML
shifts leftward by more than if public investment
were increased by itself. Thus, in the short run
there is no effect on the aggregate variables. How-
ever, in the long run private consumption will rise
and labor will fall. Since public output rises in the
long run and private output falls, the effect on
total output is indeterminate.20
Finally, what if the government reduces defense
spending and legislates an investment-enhancing
reduction in capital taxes? Briefly, in the short run
there are no effects on OOS. There are offsetting
Figure 7
Effects of Lower Defense Spending
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19 If public capital is not separable in production and produc-
tion is constant-returns-to-scale in all inputs, then the public
capital to private labor ratio enters equations 9 through 11.
Thus, the private capital–labor ratio is not pegged by the
constant rate of time preference in equation 11 and will
adjust with changes of the public capital–labor ratio. The
government can peg the private capital–labor ratio to the
discount rate by varying the public capital–labor ratio
(using lump-sum taxes to balance its budget). It then is free
to pursue the policies discussed above with the same
aggregate effects.
If the government targets a higher public capital–labor
ratio, the marginal product of private capital rises in the long
run, raising the private capital–labor ratio. In the short run,
public and private investment increase, causing MMS to
shift down. Assuming that supply effects dominate demand
effects, line MML will shift up. Line OOL shifts rightward
because wages rise, while OOS remains unaffected. Thus,
the graphical analysis resembles the case of increasing
public investment and simultaneously reducing capital
taxes.
20 What if (separable) public capital is raised and public
consumption is reduced dollar for dollar? In this case, line
OOS shifts up. Since labor rises in the short run and the
capital–labor ratio falls, private investment will increase.
Thus, MMS shifts down. Therefore, labor, investment, and
output rise in the short run, while private consumption may
rise or fall. Also, line MML will shift upwards because of the
supply effect of public investment. At the same time, line
OOL will shift down when public consumption is not sepa-
rable. Thus, it follows that labor and output fall in the long
run, but the effect on consumption is uncertain.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 62
effects on investment, so that the effects on MMS
are unclear. In the long run, both MML and OOL
will shift upward, except that the shift of MML will
be magnified. Since the short-run effects depend
on how MMS shifts, consumption will move in the
opposite direction of labor (and output). In the
long run, consumption rises, labor falls, and the
effect on output is ambiguous.
Conclusion
In this article, I have developed a simple
framework to analyze the effects of various fiscal
policies. Abstracting from distributional considera-
tions, this model is useful for looking at the short-
run and long-run effects of various taxation and
expenditure schemes. In particular, I contrast wage
income taxation (or taxes on labor) with interest
income taxation (or taxes on capital), and I contrast
defense spending with government investment.
The effects of the policy experiments are summa-
rized in Table 1. These particular instruments are
chosen because they figured prominently in the
fiscal policy debate of 1992. Also, many fiscal
policies can be described as a combination of these
four instruments. For instance, it is shown that
most corporate taxes are equivalent to personal
income taxes in their effects on macroeconomic
aggregates. This is because corporate and personal
income taxes ultimately tax the inputs to produc-
tion. This equivalence lies at the heart of econo-
mists’ observation that the current tax system
heavily taxes capital.
The model suggests that increases in taxes
on inputs will depress output and consumption in
the long run. While labor taxes tend to lower labor
and capital in the long run, capital taxes lower
capital but may raise or lower labor in the long
run. The model also shows that a consumption
tax is equivalent to a tax on labor. Thus, a differ-
ential change in factor taxes may have been implicit
in some of the 1992 campaign proposals for a
pro-investment restructuring of business taxes.
Suppose that capital taxes are lowered and labor
(or consumption) taxes raised such that the effect
is neutral on government revenues. In this case, it
Table 1
Summary of Policy Effects
Short-Run Effects Long-Run Effects
Capital– Capital–
Con- labor Invest- Con- labor
Policy sumption Labor ratio ment Output sumption Labor ratio Capital Output
Higher labor tax – – + – – – – 0 – –
Higher capital tax + – + – – – ? – – –
Higher labor tax
and lower
capital tax – – + – – + – + + +
Lower defense
spending + – + – – + – 0 – –
Higher public




investment 0 0 0 0 0 + – 0 – ?
Lower defense
spending and
lower capital tax ? ? ? ? ? + – + + ?Economic Review — Third Quarter 1993 63
is likely that consumption, labor, and output will
fall in the short run. In the long run, labor still
may fall, but consumption and output will rise.
Thus, it is possible that changing the tax mix will
have expansionary long-run effects on the economy
and still be revenue neutral. However, these long-
run benefits must be weighed against their short-
run costs.21
On the other hand, the model proposes that
spending the peace dividend from reduced defense
spending on public investment will yield long-run
benefits and no short-run costs. A reduction in
defense expenditures tends to increase consump-
tion and reduce capital, labor, and output in the
short and long run. By contrast, public investment
will raise labor and output and lower consump-
tion in the short run; it will reduce labor and raise
consumption and output in the long run. Thus, if
government investment increases and defense
spending falls dollar for dollar, consumption, labor,
and output are not affected in the short run, but
in the long run, consumption rises and labor and
private capital fall. Whether output rises depends
on the output effects of shifting from private capital
to public capital. The model also has implications
for when the peace dividend is used to create a
more investment-friendly business tax structure by
reducing tax distortions on capital. In the short
run, output may rise or fall; however, consump-
tion and output (and labor) will move in opposite
directions in the short run. In the long run, con-
sumption and capital will rise while labor falls.
Whether output rises depends on the output effects
of shifting from labor to private capital.
Whether this last option is preferable to
increasing public investment was a principle differ-
ence between the major contending fiscal policy
platforms. However, it turns out that both options
would be likely to have very similar qualitative
outcomes in the long run. And they also appear to
be similar to a shift from capital to labor (or con-
sumption) taxes in their long-run effects. While
these three policies have qualitatively similar long-
run effects, their short-run effects are dissimilar.
Increasing public investment by reducing defense
spending dollar-for-dollar clearly dominates a
differential tax change (from a labor tax to a capital
tax) in the short run. Whether this policy also
dominates a reduction of defense spending and
capital taxes depends on whether output rises or
falls. And since consumption will move opposite
to output, the ranking of the short-run effects of
the last two policies depends on whether the public
puts a higher value on movements in consump-
tion or output. Currently, the empirical testing of
these models is an active area of research. This
research will provide estimates of the short-run
and long-run policy effects and help in deciding
which policies are implemented.
21 Note that increasing the progressivity of the personal
income tax by increasing taxes on the rich (and maybe
lowering taxes on the middle class) is a capital tax in
disguise. Because the share of capital income increases
with income, taxing the rich taxes capital income (and
reducing middle class taxes lowers labor taxes). Thus,
increasing the progressivity of the income tax might
offset the pro-investment business tax restructuring dis-
cussed above.Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 64
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